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Abstract 
We explore the relationship between human migration and OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) using a complex systems’ approach, and we demonstrate how complex systems’ 
techniques can contribute new insights and advance macroeconomic empirical analysis in 
alternative ways. More precisely, we find a strong correlation between the migration network 
and the outward-FDI network, and we highlight the existence of a weaker FDI relationship in 
pairs of countries that are more central in the migration network. Illuminating this result, we 
show that inward migrants coming from third-party countries which are linked (a) either to FDI-
parent country or to FDI-host country or (b) both to FDI-parent and FDI-host country are FDI 
marring.  
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1 Introduction 
During the past decades there was a huge flow of people, capital and knowledge around the 
world, which can be mainly attributed to human migration across borders and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). And while throughout the literature it has been of major interest to explore the 
mechanisms of globalization, little attention has been paid in answering the question of whether 
immigration is related to FDI. Only a small part of the literature (see next section) has explored 
so far possible links between FDI and migration, suggesting that cross-border capital flows are 
affected by bilateral migration. As argued, the migration of people brings to the destination 
country factors of production, like capital and labor, but also a social network connected to 
immigrants’ origin country. These social networks may lower potential barriers to international 
investment, as immigrants possess crucial information about the structure of the local market, the 
preferences, as well as the business ethics and the commercial codes. This knowledge can be 
proved invaluable for overcoming many informational and contractual barriers, leading to 
stimulated investment activities across national boundaries. 
Whereas previous studies have focused on migrants within a single country, this is a work 
analyzing migration and FDI between many countries. The paper brings together a wide range of 
bilateral migration, FDI positions, geopolitical, demographic, economic, and socioeconomic data 
for 30 OECD countries around the year 2000 and investigates if migrant networks do reduce 
contractual and informational barriers between countries.  
More precisely, the current paper contributes to the existing literature by investigating the 
topological properties of the OECD’s outward FDI network and the OECD’s migration network. 
Considering both a binary and a weighted network approach, we use a complex-network 
perspective in order to study the correlation patterns of the two networks (see Fagiolo and 
Mastrorillo, 2014, for an analysis that explores similar issues using a trade perspective instead of 
FDI). First, we scout the patterns of correlation between the two networks by comparing link 
weights, topological structures and node statistics, finding a strong correlation which can be 
mostly explained by countries’ economic, demographic and geographical differences. Then, we 
add migration-network variables in a gravity regression equation of outward FDI 
stocks/positions while controlling for countries’ network-centralization and the intensity of 
common as well as non-overlapping inward migration channels. We find that pairs of countries 
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that are more central in the migration network are less FDI related. Furthermore, we highlight the 
existence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between the intensity of both the 
common and the non-overlapping migration channels of countries with outward FDI: inward 
migrants coming from third-party countries can be FDI marring, in addition to common inward 
ones. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the related 
literature. Thereafter, section 3 describes our dataset and visualizes the two networks, while 
section 4 presents the topological properties of the two networks. The empirical results are 
discussed in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes our analysis. 
 
2 Related Literature 
The literature linking FDI and migration is relatively scarce and usually refers either to within a 
particular country’s migrants affecting bilateral investment with their country-of-birth, or to the 
migrants from a particular country living in a number of other countries affecting capital flows 
between those other countries. The workhorse gravity equation model for bilateral trade flows is 
increasingly used to analyze FDI (Wei, 2000; Razin and Sadka, 2007; Blonigen et al. 2007). 
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and Head and Ries (2008) develop the leading theoretical models 
that provide theoretical micro-foundations for adopting gravity equations for the analysis of FDI. 
Clemens and Williamson (2000) find that, historically, British foreign capital flowed into 
countries that also attracted a large number of migrants. In the same line, Barry (2002) use 
aggregated data to show that migration has an impact on inflows of FDI, while Gao (2003) finds 
that FDI into China is positively related to the share of the Chinese population in the FDI-parent 
country. Hunt (2004) finds that migration within Germany often takes the form of same-
employer migration and Tong (2005) shows that the number of ethnic Chinese in both the FDI-
parent and the FDI-host country is positively correlated with the cumulative amount of their 
reciprocal FDI. Kugler and Rapoport (2005) find a positive impact of the change in immigrants 
from a particular origin-country into the US on outward FDI of US firms into this country. Buch 
et al. (2006) show that there are higher stocks of inward FDI in German states hosting a large 
foreign population from the same country of origin, while Kugler and Rapoport (2007) 
demonstrate that migration and FDI inflows are negatively correlated contemporaneously but 
3 
 
migration is associated with an increase in future FDI. Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008) find that 
US outward foreign investment in a country is higher the higher the income of the immigrant 
group from that country living in the US is. Furthermore, Ligthart and Singer (2009) investigate 
the role of immigrants in Dutch outward FDI and find that they facilitate outward FDI to their 
countries of origin. 
More recently, Leblang (2010) tests the hypothesis of whether diaspora networks influence 
cross-border investment by reducing transaction and information costs. He uses dyadic cross-
sectional data for portfolio and FDI and he finds a substantively and statistically significant 
effect of diaspora networks on global investment. Moreover, Javorcik et al. (2011) investigate 
the link between the presence of migrants in the US and US FDI in the migrants’ countries of 
origin, addressing potential endogeneity of migration with respect to FDI by employing the 
instrumental variables approach. They conclude that the presence of migrants in the US increases 
the volume of US FDI in their country of origin. Foley and Kerr (2011) using firm-level data 
show that firms employing high-skilled labor from foreign countries increase both their FDI and 
their patening activity in these countries. Flisi and Murat (2011) focus on the relation between 
bilateral FDI and skilled and unskilled immigrants and they observe that FDI of UK, Germany 
and France is prompted by the ties of skilled immigrants, while the FDI of Italy and Spain is only 
influenced by their respective diasporas. Finally, Foad (2012) improves identification issues by 
looking at the US-regional distributions of FDI and immigration. Using a unique measure of 
immigrant network size for each US-state, he finds that immigration tends to lead FDI. 
Regarding the complex-network perspective of our approach, to the best of our knowledge 
although the topological properties of the international-migration network and its evolution over 
time has been explored (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2013), such an investigation is missing for the 
FDI network. The current paper not only explores the topological properties of the OECD’s 
outward FDI network but it does so by jointly investigating FDI and migration as dependent 
phenomena i.e. as if they were two fully connected layers of the directed-weighted multi-graph 
where nodes are world countries and links represent their macroeconomic interaction channels 
(Schweitzer et al., 2009).2  
2 See also Battiston et al. (2007) for a complex-network based analysis of inter-regional investment stocks within 
Europe. 
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3 Networks’ Data and Visualization 
This section outlines the data sources on migrant numbers, FDI stocks and other explanatory 
variables. An outward investment and migration cross-section was constructed for 30 OECD 
countries and up to 242 partner countries (totaling 2,155 observations after excluding the non-
available values) around the year 2000.3 FDI positions were sourced from the OECD 
International Direct Investment Database. Data are presented in millions of US dollars.4 The 30 
OECD countries included in the database hosted 71% of global inward FDI and were the source 
of 87% of global outward FDI in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Furthermore, we retrieve origin-destination (bilateral) migration data, for all the countries in the 
FDI dataset, from the Global Migration Origin Database of the Development Research Centre 
on Migration, Globalization and Poverty (Migration DRC). The database extends the basic stock 
data on international migration published by the United Nations. The data are presented in units 
of migrants and are obtained from the census undertaken in each country closest to 2000, 
identifying migrants by country of birth (Parsons et al., 2007). 
In our regression analysis below, we use bilateral country geopolitical and socioeconomic data 
published by CEPII (see www.cepii.fr). The variables are included in CEPII’s gravity and 
geodist datasets and contain information about between-country geographical distance, 
contiguity i.e. whether two countries share a border, whether the two countries have ever had a 
colonial link, share a language, a currency, or have a common legal system. The variables also 
provide information on economic partnership, trade and tariff agreements, as well as on 
countries’ areas and time zone differences. The remaining control variables, populations and 
GDP per capita, were taken from the World Development Indicators published by the World 
Bank. 
We use outward FDI positions and bilateral migration data to build two weighted-directed 
networks wherein between any two nodes there can be at most two weighted-directed links 
which describe outward capital movements and bilateral migration respectively. The generic 
element of the FDI network (FDIN) records the log of outward FDI stocks/positions, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: the 
3 We focus our analysis on the year 2000, the latest year for which we have available data for both migration and 
FDI. 
4 Details on the data may be found at stats.oecd.org. 
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stock of FDI that country 𝑖𝑖 owns in country 𝑗𝑗, where the index 𝑖𝑖 denotes the 30 OECD parent 
countries and the index 𝑗𝑗 denotes the 242 host countries for FDI for which we have matched data 
for the year 2000. On the other hand, the generic element of the migration network (MN) 
represents the stock of migrants, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , originated in country 𝑖𝑖 and present at year 2000 in country 
𝑗𝑗. Accordingly, we define the binary projection of the two networks through their adjacency 
matrices, where their generic elements are equal to one if the correspondent entry in the weighted 
version is strictly positive. 
Figure 1 shows the undirected version of (a) the migration network and (b) the outward FDI 
network in year 2000 for the top 5% of link weights, with node size drawn scaled proportionally 
to its strength. Figure 1 illustrates the central role of US in the migration network and the strong 
capital bonds between US and Great Britain. The Netherlands seem to host a considerable 
portion of OECD’s FDI stock originated mainly from US, Great Britain and Germany. Notice 
also the substantive presence of low-income countries in the migration network, while the most 
important capital movements emanate from prosperous countries.  
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Figure 1. The Migration Network (a) and the FDI Network (b) in year 2000. 
(a) (b) 
Notes: Only the top 5% of the networks’ link weights are drawn; Node size is proportional to its strength. BLUE is 
an acronym for Belgium-Luxembourg union.  
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4 Networks’ Descriptive Analysis 
Following Newman (2010), we compute basic descriptive statistics of the two networks, as 
shown in Table 1. The migration network features a more pronounced small-world property with 
a smaller average path length than in the FDI network, while the global clustering coefficient 
(transitivity) is almost double in the migration network. This implies that countries in the 
migration network have a higher tendency to form clusters i.e. if there are migration flows 
between countries (A,B), and (B,C), then there is a high probability for migration flows between 
countries (C,A). The (strong) negative assortativity coefficients we find for both networks 
indicate that capital and migration relationships happen mostly between countries with different 
degrees. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Network Statistics 
 MN  FDIN 
# nodes 218  237 
# WCC 1  1 
APL (Undirected) 1.743  1.927 
Assortativity -0.764  -0.638 
Transitivity 0.328  0.187 
Notes: Year 2000; MN: Migration Network; FDIN: FDI Network; WCC: Weakly Connected Component; APL: 
Average Path Length 
 
We further study whether the two networks display any correlated behavior by exploring link 
weights’ correlation, as shown in Figure 2. We find that a stronger link in the FDI network is 
typically associated with a stronger migration link and that this positive relation is indeed 
explained by countries’ economic-, demographic- sizes and geographic distances, stimulating the 
adoption of a gravity-like equation in the next section.  
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Figure 2. Migration network (MN) versus FDI network (FDIN) link weights 
 
Notes: Logarithmic scale. Markers size is proportional to the logged product of country populations divided by 
country distance. Colors scale (from lighter to darker) is from lower to higher values of the logged product of 
countries’ per capita GDPs divided by country distance. 
 
Next, we compare the two adjacency matrices: (i) counting the percentage of total matches 
(either ones or zeros), (ii) counting the percentage of FDI-network’s links which are also present 
in the migration network and vice versa. We find 60% of total matches (either missing or present 
links) in the two networks. Moreover, 100% of FDI-network links are also present in the 
migration network whereas 60% of migration-network links are present in the FDI-network. 
Finally, we compute the correlations between the two networks’ node-statistics. Panel (a) in 
Figure 3 indicates that node’s strengths are positively and linearly correlated in the two networks 
and this finding can be explained by countries’ economic and demographic differences. Panel (b) 
indicates that Average Nearest Neighbor Strength (ANNS) is positively correlated in the two 
networks implying that if a country foreign-invests in a country that foreign-invests a lot, is also 
FDI-connected to countries that host a lot of immigrants. Again, demographic and economic 
country characteristics are associated with the above finding but now in a different manner: 
countries with larger ANNS are smaller and poorer.  
9 
 
Figure 3. Correlation of node network statistics between migration network (MN) and FDI 
network (FDIN). 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Notes: Panel (a): Total strength; Panel (b): Average nearest-neighbor strength (ANNS); Marker size is proportional 
to logs of population; Colors scale (from lighter to darker) is from lower to higher (logged) values of GDP per 
capita.  
10 
 
5 Networks’ Regression Analysis 
In this section, we investigate whether highly connected countries in one network are also more 
connected in the other network. We further study whether network effects matter for the causal 
relationship between the two networks: we test if outward FDI of the OECD countries is 
positively related with (a) the number of migrants these two countries share, and (b) the 
centrality of those countries in the migration network (Table 2). Moreover, to control that our 
results are not driven by the identification issue that factor movements into a country may be 
caused by a demand shock, we additionally estimate only the one direction of migration –the 
opposite one to FDI: the effect of inward migration on outward FDI (Table 3). We first estimate 
the following equation, using Ordinary Least Squares with heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors:5 log𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1log (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝛼𝛼2𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎3𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎4𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎5𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎6𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎7𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎8𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎9𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎10𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎11𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎12log (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎13log (𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾2𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3~𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                                      (1) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is FDI of OECD-country 𝑖𝑖 in country 𝑗𝑗; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 are 
countries’ population and GDP per capita respectively. The dummy variables indicate whether 
the two countries have ever had a colonial link (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), share a common currency and legal 
system (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 respectively), are contiguous (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), share a language 
spoken by at least 9% of the population in both countries (𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), have an EU to ACP 
economic partnership agreement (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and whether the FDI-host country 𝑗𝑗 has signed the 
general agreement on tariffs and trade (𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is longitudinal distance in kilometers 
between the main cities in 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, while 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the value of the absolute 
difference of areas in square kilometers. 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total bilateral migration stock, defined as 
5 Since we do not have time variation, (a) we do not include country-pair fixed effects and (b) the country fixed 
effects may be too drastic, removing too much of the information in migration stocks. We therefore try to measure 
country similarities more directly using geopolitical and socioeconomic dummies.  
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𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total in-degree centralization, defined as the sum of 
the logs of the two countries in-degrees. With 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and ~𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 we study the role of 
third-country common and non-overlapping inward migration channels: 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
∑ �𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖� + 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖)�𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖
, if 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 > 0 and 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 > 0 sums up the weights of commonly-
shared inward (from third countries 𝑘𝑘) channels and ~𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ �𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖� + 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖)�𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖
, 
if either 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 > 0 or 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 > 0 sums up link weights over all inward links originated from third 
countries 𝑘𝑘 that only send migrants to either country 𝑖𝑖 or country 𝑗𝑗. 𝑝𝑝1 is a constant and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
error term. 
We further replace in equation (1) the total bilateral migration stock (𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) with the log value 
of the stock of migrants originated in country 𝑗𝑗 (FDI-host country) and present in country 𝑖𝑖 (FDI-
parent country), demonstrating that our empirical results on factor movements between two 
countries are not driven by a demand shock. 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the (log) in-degree centralization of the FDI-
parent country. log𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�1log (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝛼𝛼�2𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎�3𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎�4𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎�5𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎�6𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎�7𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎�8𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎�9𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎�10𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎�11𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎�12log (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎�13log (𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽�log (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾�1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝑝𝑝2 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                               
(2) 
Note that the bilateral migrant stocks (resp. the inward migrant stocks) in a pair of countries 
(resp. in the FDI-parent country) increase the host country’s FDI stock originated from the FDI-
parent country. The impact of the control variables is strong, significant and signed as expected. 
We want to highlight that the addition of network statistics induces an increase in adjusted R-
squared. The network variables have a negative and statistically significant effect on outward 
FDI (in both versions of the equation considered) implying that the more total immigrants a pair 
of country holds (resp. the FDI-parent country holds), the lower the parent country’s FDI in the 
other country. In columns (3) and (4) we check whether this result is due to common versus non-
overlapping channels and we find that inward migrants coming from third-party countries which 
are linked (a) either to FDI-parent country or to FDI-host country or (b) both to FDI-parent and  
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 Table 2. Regression Results (Outward FDI and Total Migration) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-0.7947***)  (-0.8346***)  (-0.8315***)  (-0.8003***) 
  -(0.0427)***  -(0.0456)***  -(0.0456)***  -(0.0427)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.5803***)  (-0.5975***)  (-0.5926***)  (-0.5745***) 
  -(0.0378)***  -(0.0388)***  -(0.0385)***  -(0.0378)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-2.7075***)  (-2.8126***)  (-2.7956***)  (-2.7129***) 
  -(0.0909)***  -(0.1004)***  -(0.0991)***  -(0.0910)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.8902***)  (-0.9132***)  (-0.9103***)  (-0.9032***) 
  -(0.0370)***  -(0.0382)***  -(0.0381)***  -(0.0382)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.3902***)  (-0.3661***)  (-0.3709***)  (-0.3844***) 
  -(0.0910)***  -(0.0917)***  -(0.0914)***  -(0.0907)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.2066***)  (-0.2100***)  (-0.2072***)  (-0.1988***) 
  -(0.0930)***  -(0.0934)***  -(0.0935)***  -(0.0936)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.0993***)  (-0.0936***)  (-0.0944***)  (-0.0976***) 
  -(0.0471)***  -(0.0471)***  -(0.0471)***  -(0.0471)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.4404***)  (-0.4276***)  (-0.4303***)  (-0.4428***) 
  -(0.0890)***  -(0.0887)***  -(0.0888)***  -(0.0888)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.2474***)  (-0.2524***)  (-0.2532***)  (-0.2546***) 
  -(0.0752)***  -(0.0750)***  -(0.0751)***  -(0.0747)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.0508***)  (-0.0402***)  (-0.0415***)  (-0.0520***) 
  -(0.0495)***  -(0.0498)***  -(0.0498)***  -(0.0498)*** 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.2184***)  (-0.2401***)  (-0.2368***)  (-0.2223***) 
  -(0.0501)***  -(0.0512)***  -(0.0510)***  -(0.0502)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  (-0.1731***)  (-0.1650***)  (-0.1688***)  (-0.1520***) 
  -(0.0584)***  -(0.0581)***  -(0.0581)***  -(0.0592)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  (-0.0890***)  (-0.0795***)  (-0.0796***)  (-0.0837***) 
  -(0.0245)***  -(0.0248)***  -(0.0248)***  -(0.0246)*** 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.1348***)  (-0.1494***)  (-0.1460***)  (-0.1362***) 
  -(0.0162)***  -(0.0172)***  -(0.0170)***  -(0.0162)*** 
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (-0.0720***)     
    -(0.0301)***     
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (-0.0631***)   
      -(0.0295)***   ~𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (-0.0405***) 
        -(0.0208)*** 
         
𝑅𝑅2  71.43%  71.53%  71.51%  71.48% 
𝑅𝑅2 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  71.22%  71.31%  71.29%  71.26% 
No of Observations  1,946  1,946  1,946  1,946 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Outward FDI. Independent Variables: see text. Regressions are estimated 
by OLS and numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The symbols *, 
** and *** reveal statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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 Table 3. Regression Results (Outward FDI and Inward Migration) 
  (1)  (2) 
     
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-0.9201***)  (-1.0568***) 
  -(0.0415)***  -(0.0573)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-0.7049***)  (-0.6617***) 
  -(0.0342)***  -(0.0358)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)  (-2.7616***)  (-3.0121***) 
  -(0.0993)***  -(0.1220)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�  (-1.0088***)  (-0.9931***) 
  -(0.0335)***  -(0.0340)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.4878***)  (-0.4470***) 
  -(0.0940)***  -(0.0943)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.2471***)  (-0.2450***) 
  -(0.0938)***  -(0.0942)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.1202***)  (-0.1174***) 
  -(0.0483)***  -(0.0483)*** 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.5215***)  (-0.5037***) 
  -(0.0916)***  -(0.0909)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.3215***)  (-0.3122***) 
  -(0.0758)***  -(0.0740)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.0749***)  (-0.0812***) 
  -(0.0504)***  -(0.0502)*** 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (-0.2584***)  (-0.2696***) 
  -(0.0511)***  -(0.0511)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  (-0.2613***)  (-0.2386***) 
  -(0.0609)***  -(0.0607)*** 
𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  (-0.0767***)  (-0.0612***) 
  -(0.0249)***  -(0.0252)*** log (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  (-0.1096***)  (-0.1554***) 
  -(0.0258)***  -(0.0284)*** 
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖    (-0.1959***) 
    -(0.0567)*** 
     
𝑅𝑅2  70.58%  70.76% 
𝑅𝑅2 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  70.37%  70.54% 
No of Observations  1,946  1,946 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Outward FDI. Independent Variables: see text. Regressions are estimated 
by OLS and numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The symbols *, 
** and *** reveal statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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FDI-host country are FDI marring. The above results suggest that in contrast to migration effects, 
capital flows from FDI-parent country to FDI-host country may decrease due to countries’ (resp. 
FDI-host country’s) weighted connectivity in the migration network. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Throughout the world, economies are becoming rapidly integrated and the level of dependence 
between them increases exponentially. Globalization has led to a rapid growth in the flow of 
factors of production across borders. From 1980 to 2010, there has been an increase of about 65 
million in the foreign population in the OECD countries, while the volume of FDI grew four 
times as fast as world output during the same period. The international flow of people and capital 
are important features of this integrated global economy and taken together, the international 
investment channels and the migration corridors constitute a convoluted and complicated web of 
relationships among countries. 
This paper has explored the properties and the link between migration and FDI on a complex-
network perspective. Diasporas in the OECD attract FDI to their origin countries and this result 
can be mostly explained by countries’ economic, demographic and geographic characteristics. 
We have also found that outward FDI can be explained by countries’ centrality in the 
international migration network and, interestingly, our results indicate that the larger the number 
and the “diameter” of third-party (countries) inward migration “tubes” that “debouche” in any 
two countries, the lower the stock of capital in the FDI-host country hold from the FDI-parent 
country. Perhaps, more generally, the results reported above are intended to demonstrate that it is 
feasible and realistic to model the world economy as a complex network, where nodes and links 
represent countries and economic-interaction channels respectively and that, in doing so, we can 
advance the macroeconomic analysis in interesting and meaningful ways. 
Overall, we were able to provide statistically and economically significant results for the 
relationship between FDI and migration through our complex-network analysis. However, we do 
believe that there is space for improvement of this approach. Particularly, we suggest an 
examination of a wide set of immigrant characteristics which, along with our network variables 
could provide further insight on the relationship between human migration and FDI. Higher 
frequency of the migration data should also provide a considerable improvement for future 
15 
 
studies since so far migration datasets are based on censuses conducted every ten years, while 
FDI data are updated annually, creating a frequency mismatch. Finally, the focus on the current 
paper was placed on direct investment that generally builds on a wide network of economic 
agents, requiring a long-run focus on the characteristics of the host country. Thus, the 
examination of how human migration affects short-term portfolio investment flows could 
provide us with interesting results. Any future amendments in our complex systems’ approach 
can lead us in a deeper understanding of the theory connecting migration and foreign investment 
and the macroeconomic empirical analysis in general.  
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